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Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to understand why after two decades proposing the creation of a political 
union to make European monetary union (EMU) sustainable, Germany has not utilised the 
‘window’ offered by the Eurozone crisis to pursue more vigorously this goal. Using the 
conceptual devices of the Chartalist understanding of money and hegemony, three possible 
explanations are explored. 1) Germany is slowly becoming a ‘normal’ European power and 
has started to favour the intergovernmental to the community method. 2) The German public 
has lost its enthusiasm for European integration, especially after realising how the proposed 
banking union has brought the spectrum of a ‘transfer union’ closer. 3) Germany remains a 
reluctant hegemon and once it has seen that France is still not ready for political union it has 
refrained from actively promoting this ideal. The conclusion of the paper is that the first two 
explanations have some merits, but that the third one continues to be the most convincing. 
The zeal by which the German political elites, supported by their public opinion, have pushed 
through the Spitzenkandidaten logic in the 2014 European elections confirms that Berlin is 
still determined to build a more federal Europe. The question is rather whether Paris is ready 
to participate in this endeavour.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Germany plays a fundamental role in the economic and political stability of the European 
continent. This has been the case for centuries. Since the mid 15th century the territories that 
lay in what is today the Federal Republic of Germany have been crucial in determining the 
balance of power in Europe. No matter whether we analyse the attempts of Charles V and 
Philipp II of Spain to create a Universal Monarchy, the caliphate of Suleiman the Magnificent 
and his successors’ desires to dominate Europe, Napoleon’s ambition to establish a 
continental bloc, the Mitteleuropa of Imperial Germany, Hitler’s Third Reich, the socialist 
utopia of the Soviet Union, and more recently the construction of NATO and the European 
Union, “in each case the central area of contention was Germany: because of its strategic 
position at the heart of Europe [and] because of its immense economic and military potential” 
(Simms 2013:530). The importance of the German territories for the maintenance of the 
balance of power in Europe has been a preoccupation for British rulers since Henry VIII. 
London opposed for centuries any attempt by imperial Spain and France to control this 
region, and later, when Germany united, it fought two world wars to avoid German 
domination of the Continent. The obsession by David Cameron, the current British Prime 
Minister, to fight anything that hints to German-led euro-federalism follows this tradition.       
This is striking because after WWII, London seemed to have found a way to solve the 
‘German Problem’. This was articulated by Winston Churchill (1946) when he stated that 
“there is a remedy which…would in a few years make all Europe…free and…happy. It is to 
re-create the European family, or as much of it as we can, and provide it with a structure 
under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United 
States of Europe” based primarily on French-German reconciliation. Interestingly, 70 years 
later Churchill’s call to create a more united Europe around Germany has been embraced by 
another British intellectual with influence on both sides of the Channel: Anthony Giddens 
(2013:211), who believes that the ‘German Europe’ that has emerged in the aftermath of the 
Eurozone crisis “is not a situation that will remain for the indefinite future, as so many now 
fear. It is necessarily temporary and it is intrinsically unstable. That is why a federal solution, 
backed by greater legitimacy and leadership capacity on an EU level, is the only feasible way 
forward”.   
Over the past 50 years Germany’s classical European policy has epitomised the spirit of an 
“ever closer union”. Since the post-WWII era, German leaders and the public at large have 
recognised that the only way to preserve peace, stability and prosperity in the Continent is 
through deeper integration. While the other two big powers of the EU: France and the United 
Kingdom have always been jealous of their national sovereignty (a legacy of their centralist 
traditions), Germany – traumatised by its bellicose past and weary of the threat of Russia in 
the East – has never shied away from proposing further pooling of sovereignty (a concession 
facilitated by its federal tradition). This became evident in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s when 
the idea of a European monetary union (EMU) started to materialise. Since the Werner 
Report published in 1970, the debate between German ‘economists’ (who believe in 
economic convergence and political union as a precondition for a stable monetary union) and 
French ‘monetarists’ (who see monetary and economic union as precursors of political union) 
has clearly shown how Berlin has always been more comfortable than Paris with the idea of 
creating a more federalised EU (Dyson & Featherston 1999; Marsh 2009). As a matter of 
fact, Berlin has in numerous occasions over the past 25 years proposed the creation of a 
political union to make the monetary union sustainable, while Paris has always considered 
this topic taboo.   
This happened again at the peak of the Eurozone crisis. After two years of foot-dragging, in 
early June 2012, the always-cautious German Chancellor Angela Merkel seemed to revive 
the spirit of Helmut Kohl and declared live and on German public television that EMU needs 
a political union to survive. It seemed that Germany was ready to use the window offered by 
the crisis to bring forward the ultimate stage in European integration. However, this was the 
first and last time that Merkel mentioned this concept. Since the crucial European Council 
meeting in late June 2012 – which called for the important step to create a banking union 
(with an implicit fiscal union) in the Euro Area – the German government has shied away 
from actively endorsing the necessity of establishing a political union, despite numerous calls 
from in and outside Europe for Germany to take the lead in pushing for deeper political 
integration. Hence, it can be argued that for a long time Germany talked the talk of the 
necessity of political union, but when the real moment came it did not walk the walk. The 
aim of this paper is to try to explain this apparent u-turn by the German government.  
Three explanations will be put forward. The first relates to the widespread view that Germany 
is slowly acting as a ‘normal’ European power, which similarly to the UK and France, is 
more interested in safeguarding its own national interest rather than enhancing the common 
good. The second explanation is linked to the first and refers to the gradual erosion of support 
for political union among the German public in the past decades. This was particularly 
evident in the aftermath of the crucial June 2012 European Council. Once the possibility of a 
banking and fiscal union was seriously considered at the highest level, the conservative media 
and pundits in Germany raised the spectrum of a ‘transfer union’ and public opinion turned 
actively against this possibility.  
However, despite the seeds of truth that can be found in these two explanations, as will be 
shown below, they are not totally convincing. We are in front of a multi-causal u-turn that 
warrants a third explanation. Berlin’s recent cautiousness on the possibility of establishing a 
political union might have more to do with Germany’s historic status as a reluctant hegemon 
(Chang 2003; Paterson 2011) rather than its narrow desire to advance its national interests. 
Thus, in the following it will be argued that, fully aware of the fears that a more assertive 
Germany can resurrect in the Continent, the German government still prefers the community 
to the intergovernmental method in European integration. But given that France is not ready 
to relinquish its fiscal sovereignty to Brussels, Berlin has decided to stay put on this front. In 
a nutshell, the main argument put forward is that the Franco-German marriage is still the key 
partnership in Europe. Hence, Germany is still waiting for France to construct jointly the 
political union that is necessary to make the euro sustainable. 
The paper is organised as follows. After this introduction, the second section offers the 
theoretical framework. Two conceptual devices will be used: money and hegemony. Drawing 
from the Chartalist school of money, it will be explained that for EMU to last, the Eurozone 
will have to create a legitimate political authority that can centrally underpin the euro. 
Germany could potentially be the hegemon that drives this process, but given Europe’s past, 
Berlin will need to achieve this in partnership with Paris and in a non-hegemonic way. The 
second section summarises chronologically German attempts to convince France to establish 
a political union. It shows how the June 2012 European Council could be seen as a turning 
point in this strategy. Following up, the third section presents the three explanations 
summarised above which might help to understand Germany’s recent reluctance to pursue 
political union. It will show that Germany remains committed to further integration but its 
reluctant hegemon status impedes it to push forward without the support of France. The paper 
ends with some concluding remarks.       
 
2. Money and Hegemony  
Although mainstream economists have only one explanation on the origins of money, the fact 
is that historically there have been two ways to understand the nature of money (Goodhart 
1998; Ingham 2004). The first is represented by the orthodox, also called Metallist, school of 
money (this is the one described in standard economics textbooks) which believes that money 
emerged spontaneously from the market to overcome the problems of the double coincidence 
of wants of barter. Historically market agents have always chosen a commodity that is rare, 
hence intrinsically valuable, divisible and durable as their preferred medium of exchange, 
thus silver and gold became the most used types of money. Under this understanding, money 
is just another commodity which follows the rules of demand and supply and which acts as a 
neutral veil in the workings of the economy. For this school money can perfectly function 
without political interference. It is a tool that reduces transaction costs. More importantly, 
since it is a neutral device, it can be discarded in the analysis of the real economy.     
Optimum Currency Area theory (Mundell 1961) builds on this tradition. It applies the logic 
of the metallist school of money on the spatial dimension. It argues that a single currency can 
reduce transaction costs in areas which have high degree of mobility in their factors of 
production, such as capital and labour. Again, here there is no necessity of political 
interference. In its pure logic, OCA theory says that a big nation state such as Russia or China 
could have several currencies, and several very integrated states, such as the Benelux, could 
share one currency. This de-politicisation of money is crucial to understand why in the 1990s 
the official mantra from the European Commission was that the euro would provide one 
single money for one single market, and this would greatly reduce transaction costs and spur 
economic activity. Under this logic, money remains a neutral device and therefore credit 
relations, and their inherent social and political power struggles, are overlooked. 
There is however another view on money represented by the heterodox, also called Chartalist, 
school of money which claims that the most important function of money is not to be the 
medium of exchange, but rather the unit of account, which historically has emanated from the 
taxing scale imposed (through persuasion or coercion) by the sovereign on its subjects in any 
given monetary space (Goodhart 1998; Ingham 2004; Martin 2013). Hence, following this 
interpretation, money cannot exist without a centralised and legitimised political authority 
that can underpin it. As Ingham (2004:25) points out, “it is difficult to envisage how a money 
of account could emerge from myriad bilateral barter exchange ratios based upon subjective 
preferences. One hundred goods could possibly yield 4,950 exchange rates”. Consequently, 
“the very idea of money, which is to say, of abstract accounting for value, is logically 
anterior and historically prior to market exchange”. Hence, since the Mesopotamian and 
Egyptian empires around 2500 BC, money has always been introduced by a political 
authority.  
In history there have been numerous examples of private ‘near’ moneys, such as the bills of 
exchange of the giant merchant houses in medieval Europe, the derivative markets of modern 
finance, or the most recent Bitcoin market, but ultimately because of war, major defaults or 
widespread market uncertainty these types of private credit systems always collapsed (Martin 
2013). Money is always debt, and debt is the counterpart of credit, therefore money is a social 
relation between creditor and debtor, and as in all social relations it is inherently loaded with 
notions of power (Graeber 2011). As the word credit indicates, money is based on trust, and 
trust in money in modern societies comes from the fact that in moments of crisis the state acts 
as the mediator between creditors and debtors, if need be by the use of the legitimised use of 
force. It also happens that the state is the main debtor (issues debt to cover public services) 
and creditor (collects taxes) of any modern monetary system, which means that when it 
comes to money there is a hierarchical pyramid, and the legal tender (therefore the Charta), 
sanctioned by the sovereign state to redeem taxes, sits at the top. Money exists because there 
is a sovereign authority, with its full fiscal capacity, behind it. Full Stop.  
If we accept this second conception of money, the euro is an orphan currency, and this is the 
reason why it is so fragile and exposed to the speculative attacks of financial market 
operators. When the euro was created Germany was inclined to build a political union to 
make it more robust (Dyson & Featherstone 1999), but France was against this idea, so the 
compromise was to create an EMU based on a strongly orthodox framework (the Maastricht 
Treaty) which would convince market operators that this was a strong currency with a 
fiercely independent European Central Bank which would never allow the monetisation of 
debt, historically the nightmare scenario of international creditors (Ingham 2004). By not 
being able to create a European sovereign, France and Germany agreed to establish a system 
with a lot of rules, but with very little political discretion. This de-politicisation, or one might 
say de-chartalisation, of the euro was for a long time seen as a positive feature, but the recent 
Eurozone debt crisis has shown that it is a source of great instability.  
From 2010 until 2012 market operators were continuously asking: what is the political 
project behind EMU? Where is the central political authority that can stabilise this monetary 
space? While these questions remained unanswered, betting on the collapse of the euro was a 
logical reaction. The situation only stabilised in June and July 2012 when Chancellor Merkel 
spoke openly about political union, when she agreed to establish a banking union, and 
crucially when Mario Draghi stated that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to save the 
euro – and even more importantly when days later Merkel threw her political weight, and 
consequently that of the German taxpayer, behind those words.  
Consequently, recent events have shown that the survival of the euro out of this existential 
crisis is not due to the fact that it is a neutral and de-politicised currency that reduces 
transaction costs, but rather because market agents have discovered that the political authority 
underpinning the project resides in Berlin. In this regard, pleas to Germany to take the lead 
and push for further integration and create the fiscal and political union necessary for the 
stability of EMU have been widespread. The influential investor George Soros (2012) has 
passionately argued that Germany should lead or leave the Euro Area. “As the strongest 
creditor country, Germany has emerged as the hegemon [and] if Germany chose to behave as 
a benevolent hegemon. That would mean implementing the proposed banking union; 
establishing a Debt Reduction Fund, and eventually converting all debt into Eurobonds”.  
The Polish foreign minister, Radoslaw Sikorski (2011), was even bolder in his plea for Berlin 
to act: 
I demand of Germany that, for its own sake and for ours, it help the eurozone survive 
and prosper. Nobody else can do it. I will probably be the first Polish foreign minister 
in history to say this, but here it is: I fear German power less than I am beginning to 
fear its inactivity. You have become Europe’s indispensable nation.   
Similar demands have also come from academia. Matthijs and Blyth (2011) have argued that 
“to solve the European crisis and avoid repeating the mistakes of the late 1920s and the 1930s, 
those sitting in Berlin and Brussels should put down their Andrew Mellon and read Charles 
Kindleberger”. Delong and Eichengreen (2012), drawing also on Kindleberger and his 
hegemonic stability theory, come to a similar conclusion, stating that “the German federal 
government, the political incarnation of the single most consequential economic power, is one 
potential hegemon” for Europe.  
Their arguments are convincing. Germany could act as the single stabilizer of the Euro Area 
by providing five key public goods: 1) A market for distressed goods. Germany should 
increase its domestic demand; 2) Counter-cyclical long-term lending. The creation of a 
redemption fund and a banking union with a sizable fiscal backstop could be a start, and 
targeted investment in the cash-strapped periphery should follow; 3) Stable exchange rates. 
The euro has shown that it is a strong and stable currency throughout the crisis, but too much 
of a good thing might be counterproductive. In a world of open currency wars, Germany’s 
obsession with non-interference in the exchange rate can be seen as too dogmatic. The Euro 
Area, with Germany at the front, could be more active in trying to convince the other 
members of the G20 to have more stable exchange rates; 4) Macroeconomic policy 
coordination. Germany could take the lead in the creation of a gouvernment économique 
which could coordinate structural reforms, both on the demand and supply sides of the Euro 
Area economy. For this, there should be a centralised fiscal budget to overcome asymmetric 
shocks and coordinate targeted fiscal transfers in exchange for reforms; 5) The creation of a 
lender of last resort. Berlin should accept that the ECB needs to be the lender of last resort in 
times of financial distress both for banks and member states. If this requires the creation of a 
centralised treasury and a political union to control national budgets, so be it. 
Given that these proposals are perceived as sound for a large majority of observers in the US, 
most of continental Europe and key emerging markets such as China and Brazil, there is 
increased despair about German inaction. The general view is that, “the problem today is not 
German strength but German weakness – a reluctance to take up its hegemonic role” (Matthijs 
& Blyth 2011). The key question, however, is whether Germany is ready to take the 
leadership role demanded from it. Here it might be useful to differentiate between types of 
hegemons. Traditionally, the literature has focused on coercive and benign hegemons, but as 
Chang (2003:223) points out, an additional distinction might be warranted. There are 
hegemons “that aspire to it and those that find hegemony thrust upon them”. This variation is 
crucial to understand the behaviour of Germany and its reluctance to take a leadership role. 
Following Chang’s conceptualisation: 
Both types of [hegemons] posses a certain amount of power and influence, but what 
they do with this power differs greatly. A state that welcomes the prospect of 
hegemony, even pursues it actively, undertakes leadership in a manner that one typically 
associates with a state that possesses a preponderance of power. Such a state uses its 
power to create regimes that allow it to pursue its interests or provide public goods. A 
reluctant hegemon, one on which hegemony presents itself by virtue of the state’s power 
and strength, will not push forward cooperation.   
Germany has over the past decades shown, and this has been even more apparent during the 
Euro Area debt crisis, that it is a reluctant hegemon. Berlin, personified by the cautious 
character of Angela Merkel, has only acted in the midst of the crisis when the Euro Area was 
about to collapse. Illustratively, it has not taken a leadership role in the creation of the two 
permanent and important institutions that have emerged from the crisis and signify a 
deepening of EMU: the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the banking union. It can 
be agued that Germany took the lead in the creation and signing of the Fiscal Compact, but 
the new treaty is effectively a Maastricht 2.0, which does not go beyond strengthening the 
Growth and Stability Pact (GSP).  
When it came to create new institutions, which pave the way for the mutualisation of risks 
and revenues in the future, it was France which took the lead. Sarkozy played an important 
role in convincing Merkel, first in the run up to the historic European Council weekend of 9-
10 May 2010, to establish the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), and then in the 
controversial bilateral meeting in Deauville on 18 October 2010, to establish the permanent 
ESM (Jamet et al. 2013). Likewise, it was François Hollande’s decision to back Spain and 
Italy in the 29 June 2012 European Council meeting which finally persuaded Merkel to 
agree on the creation of a banking union, which theoretically should break the doom-loop 
between national banks and their governments. Furthermore, the Fiscal Compact would not 
have been signed if Sarkozy, and later Hollande, would not have given it their political 
support, despite intense pressure at home to reject such a German-inspired, and for many, 
heavily anti-Keynesian treaty.  
Although the common view is that Germany has conceded very little during the crisis 
(Paterson 2011). This is not necessarily true. Schild (2013a:30), for example, argues that 
“France forcefully used the window of opportunity of this sovereign debt crisis to promote 
major changes to the economic governance structures of the Euro Area along the lines of its 
long-lasting preferences”. The creation of the EFSF and later the ESM is a case in point. 
Before the crisis, Germany was always opposed to the creation of a permanent rescue 
mechanism with the capacity to issue common liabilities. This Rubicon has now been 
crossed, which means a huge triumph for Paris and its desire to enhance the solidarity 
structures in EMU. As the former French State Secretary for European Affairs, Pierre 
Lellouche, has put it, “[t]he Euro 440 billion mechanism [of the EFSF] is nothing less than 
the importation of NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense clause applied to the Eurozone. When 
one member is under attack the others are obliged to come to its defense” (cited in Schild 
2013a:30).   
Thus, these events demonstrate that again and again, European integration is not based on 
German hegemony, but rather on the crucial cooperation between Berlin and Paris in what 
Pedersen (1998) has once called ‘cooperative hegemony’, Calleo et al. (1999) dubbed the 
‘Franco-German engine’ and Krotz and Schild (2013) have more recently described as 
‘embedded bilateralism’ across the Rhine. Although nothing in Europe can be done without 
Germany. The fact is that Germany will not move forward towards further European 
integration if France does not go along. As Sarkozy has accurately described this particular 
marriage, “Germany without France frightens everyone. France without Germany frightens 
no one” (cited in Giddens 2014:21). The importance of the Franco-German tandem has been 
a constant over the past decades, and despite French weaknesses it is bound to remain the 
backbone of European integration (Wong & Sonntag 2012). Consequently, if Germany is 
considered the key player to create a political union to make the euro sustainable, Berlin, 
and those who argue in this direction, will need to convince Paris first.  
 
3. Germany’s overtures to political union 
  
Following the Chartalist logic, as soon as the idea of the single currency was first articulated 
in the Werner Plan in 1970, the German political establishment (including policymakers at 
the Bundesbank)2 realised that the project could only last if there was a political union 
underpinning it. They were also perfectly aware of the difficulties that such an enterprise 
would entail. Hence, they were sceptical of the French view, expressed for this first time by 
the economist Jacques Rueff, that “L’Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se fera pas” 
(Europe will be made by the currency, or it will not be made at all). In their view, to have a 
single currency, the European countries keen to participate in such a project needed first to 
convergence and then share a series of economic and monetary principles, which in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 As early as 1963, the then president of the Bundesbank, Karl Blessing, argued that the introduction of 
monetary union should be conditional on the creation of a political union (see BUBA 2012).  
German view should be based on fiscal discipline, price stability and free competition. In 
other words: the ordoliberal social market economy model of Germany. 
This conception, which later became known as the view represented by the German 
“economists”, contrasted with that of the French “monetarists”, who argued that monetary 
union would eventually lead to economic and political convergence. Thus, when it came to 
understand the relationship between money and sovereignty, the German view was that 
political union, based on common economic principles, should precede monetary union, 
while the French response was that monetary union would be the first step towards a distant 
political union (Dyson & Featherstone 1999; Marsh 2009).   
Thus, at first view it appears that the German political establishment had a more Chartalist 
understanding of money than their French counterparts. In 1990, the Bundesbank wrote that 
the member states which would participate in EMU would be inextricably linked to one 
another “come what may”, and thus that such a union would be “an irrevocable joint and 
several community which, in the light of the past experience, requires a more far-reaching 
association, in the form of a comprehensive political union, if it is to remain durable” (cited 
in BUBA 2012). On 6 November 1991 – just a few months before the signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty – the then German Chancellor Helmut Kohl made his own the analysis of 
the Bundesbank by stating in front of the Bundestag:  
It cannot be repeated often enough. Political union is the indispensable counterpart to 
economic and monetary union. Recent history, and not just that of Germany, teaches 
us that the idea of sustaining an economic and monetary union over time without 
political union is a fallacy.  
Crucially, the minutes of this parliamentary session show that this statement received a round 
of applause from all sides of the house (Bundestag 1991), including the Christian Democrats 
(CDU/CSU), the Liberal Democrats (FDP) and the Social Democrats (SPD), which signifies 
that there was ample consensus among the German political elite towards the necessity and 
desirability of political union. This was certainly not the case among the French political 
elites, still highly dominated by Gaullist attitudes on the centre-right, and sceptical of the 
liberal principles of the EU on the centre-left.  
Nevertheless, this is not to say that the Chartalist understanding of money was not present in 
Paris. It is very likely that there was a clear understanding that the euro will need a political 
authority to survive. But for most French political elites, this political authority underpinning 
EMU should not reside in a federalised structure governed by the European Commission and 
the European Parliament out of Brussels, but rather emerge from an ever closer confederation 
of nation states (L’Europe des Patries) in which the most important political and strategic 
decisions should be decided out of Paris. Thus, ironically, by attempting to tame German 
monetary power through the creation of the euro, French long-term strategists tried to obtain 
for Paris what Berlin has acquired in the aftermath of the Eurocrisis without actively pursuing 
it.  
To the contrary, in a number of occasions over the past two decades, key German 
policymakers proposed their French counterparts to eliminate the spectrum of German 
hegemony by deepening European integration through the building of more federalised 
institutions. The first time this was done in an open and coherent way was when in 1994 the 
then senior cabinet member and now current minister of Finance of Germany, Wolfgang 
Schäuble, and his colleague in the then ruling CDU/CSU, Karl Lamers, wrote a policy paper 
entitled: “Überlegungen zur europäishen Politik” (Thoughts on European policy). In it they 
put forward a number of ideas and proposals that illustrate the attitudes towards deeper 
integration that were dominant among top German policymakers then. First of all, Schäuble 
and Lamers made clear that history shows that German attempts to overcome the tensions 
between the West and the East and achieve domestic and European stability through 
hegemony have always failed. The last time that this was pursued was in WWII and “the 
military, political and moral catastrophe that this produced has demonstrated Germany not 
only the limitations of its power but most importantly that security in Europe can only be 
achieved through a fundamental reorganisation of the state system which recognises that 
hegemony is neither possible nor desirable” (Schäuble & Lamers 1994:2, own translation).  
Secondly, they proposed that the ‘core’ of the EU (this was the first time that the concept of 
‘enhanced cooperation’ was introduced) led by a strengthened Franco-German tandem, should 
aim to draft a new constitution as the legal basis for the creation of a federal state which 
should respect the principles of subsidiarity. Following the German model, this supranational 
state should have in the European Commission its government, and the legislative branch 
should be build on the European Parliament, as the lower house, and the European Council – 
which should respect both the principle of equal treatment of all member states and the size of 
the population of each of them – as the upper house. Finally, this new supranational state 
should have a common foreign and security policy aimed at stabilising the European 
neighbourhood with an enlargement to the East (which eventually happened) and with 
strategic partnerships with key players such as Russia and the US.  It is important to highlight 
here that Schäuble and Lamers saw this German initiative to deepen European integration, 
and especially the links with France, as reassurance against allegations that German 
unification and the Eastern enlargement of EU would distort the power balance between 
France and Germany – precisely the scenario that we have today. 
Not surprisingly, the idea of a federal Europe did not fly in Paris. From a French perspective, 
the concept of federalism is practically alien. The concepts of nation and centralisation are 
deeply rooted in French political culture. This relates to the deeply held jacobine conviction 
that federalism is incompatible with égalité.3 Thus, despite Germany’s increased potential 
power, Paris was not ready then to relinquish farther parts of its national sovereignty to 
Brussels.  
However, this French rebuke to German overtures did not stop the next German government 
to try again to convince the French political establishment about the necessity of deeper 
integration. In a speech delivered in 2000 the then foreign minister and Vice-Chancellor of 
Germany Joschka Fischer, from the Green Party and in a coalition government with the SPD, 
echoed the words of Schäuble and Lamers by delivering a similar message. First he made 
again clear that “the core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the 
European balance of power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that 
has emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648”. Subsequently, he emphasised that 
“eastern enlargement and the completion of political integration, will depend decisively on 
France and Germany”. In other words, “no European project will succeed in the future 
without the closest Franco-German cooperation”. Finally, Fischer (2000) put forward his 
vision by asking:  
How can one prevent the EU from becoming utterly intransparent […] and the 
citizens’ acceptance of the EU from eventually hitting rock bottom? There is a very 
simple answer: the transition from a union of states to full parliamentarization as a 
European Federation, something Robert Schuman demanded 50 years ago. And that 
means nothing less than a European Parliament and European government which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  I thank Albrecht Sonntag for pointing this out to me.	  	  
really do exercise legislative and executive power within the Federation.4 This 
Federation will have to be based on a constituent treaty.   
Given German insistence on a constitutional process, it is easy to understand why the first 
decade of the XXI Century was dedicated to draft a constitutional treaty for the EU. After 
years of discussions throughout the convention, the proposed constitutional treaty had a 
number of federalising features such as the establishment of an official flag, an anthem, more 
power to the European Parliament and the creation of the president of the European Council 
and the minister of foreign affairs. Unfortunately for European federalists, the idea of a 
supranational state was again met by fierce French opposition. This time not from the political 
elite, but from the French population who rejected in 2005 the constitutional treaty in a 
referendum,5 encouraging the Dutch population to do the same just a few days later.   
The French non and the Dutch nee to the constitutional treaty in 2005 seemed to bury the idea 
of a political union for the EU. While it is true that the treaty was repackaged and ratified 
under the Lisbon Treaty, most of its more federalising symbols were eliminated. There is no 
mention to the flag or the anthem and the foreign minister has become the High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The euro crisis has, however, revived 
the federalist camp. After almost two years listening to demands from all corners of the 
Continent and beyond to save the euro, on 7 June 2012 – when Spain, too big to fail but also 
too big to be rescued, was close to default – Chancellor Merkel finally disclosed her vision 
for Europe with this statement in the ARD, the German national public television:   
“We need more Europe, we need not only a monetary union, but we also need a so-
called fiscal union, in other words more joint budget policy. And we need most of all a 
political union – that means we need to gradually give competencies to Europe and give 
Europe control” (cited in Euractiv 2012).  
Crucially, as if it were coordinated beforehand, a few days later she was backed by the 
influential president of the Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, who stated that to make EMU 
sustainable member states needed to pool further sovereignty to the centre in order to create a 
fiscal union (cited in Handelsblatt 2012).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In the same speech, Fischer acknowledges: “the term "federation" irritates many Britons. But to date I have 
been unable to come up with another word. We do not wish to irritate anyone.” This last sentence could also be 
directed to Paris. 
5	  The reasons for the rejection of the constitutional treaty were multiple. The perceived pro-market character of 
the text was perhaps a bigger reason than its supranational objectives.	  In any case, the rejection was a blow to 
federalist ambitions.	  
It seemed that the German leadership was seizing the opportunity offered by the crisis to 
finally convince their weakened French counterparts to relinquish sovereignty to the centre of 
the Union to make EMU sustainable. Surprisingly, however, this was the first and last time 
Merkel mentioned the concept of political union to solve the Euro crisis. After the crucial 
European Council of the 29 June 2012 – when the establishment of a banking union was 
agreed – talk around ‘political union’ disappeared from the German political discourse, 
including in the political campaigns leading to the German elections in September 2013 and 
the European elections in May 2014. It seems that this particular European Council, when 
France, Italy and Spain ganged-up and obtained a major concession from Merkel, was 
another turning point in German ambitions to establish a political union.  
4. Germany’s u-turn on political union? 
Germany’s sudden cold feet in regards to establishing a political union is rather surprising 
because it was precisely in the second half of 2012 that the four presidents of the European 
institutions were instructed to draft a paper which should show the way towards the creation 
of a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union with a banking, fiscal, economic and political 
union (Van Rompuy 2012). This report was watered down (and the part on political union 
eliminated all together) due to German opposition to creating a Eurozone budget. It can be 
argued therefore that when it really mattered Germany did not fulfil its promises. What are 
the reasons for this change of attitude?  
4.1 Germany as a ‘normal’ power 
One interpretation that is gaining strength is that slowly, like the other two big powers in the 
EU: France and the UK, Germany is becoming a ‘normal power’ (Bulmer & Paterson 2010). 
European integration over the past 40 years has been driven by the fact that when it came to 
resolving the tensions emanating from diverging interests, Germany was always “willing to 
contribute a little more and take a little less than the others, thereby facilitating agreement” 
(Soros 2013). This ‘benevolent’ attitude started to change when German unification was 
completed and Gerhard Schröder arrived to the chancellery in the late 1990s. Based on its 
newly acquired power, the German government – composed for the first time by political 
leaders that did not experience WWII– is more inclined to fight for its national interests. As 
Schröder declared when he became chancellor: “Germany standing up for its national 
interests will be just as natural as France or Britain standing up for theirs” (cited in Paterson 
2011:62). The behaviour of his successor Angela Merkel has proven him right.  
In light of this new logic, during the recent Euro debt crisis – in the social relation or even 
struggle between creditor and debtor that money always is – as a creditor country, the aim of 
Germany has been to download most of the adjustment costs onto its indebted partners. This 
has been done by a strategy of using the pressure of the markets to force the peripheral 
countries to undertake the spending cuts and structural reforms that are necessary for them to 
regain their competitiveness in an increasingly globalised world, and by only intervening 
with financial help when the situation was about to be out of control.  
In this regard, Germany is playing a game of chicken with its partners (Bergsten & 
Kirkegaard 2012). It knows that the peripheral countries are only willing to undertake the 
structural reforms when they are pushed against the precipice, but it is also aware that none of 
its partner can fall into the abyss because – as the case of Greece has shown – it can 
potentially drag the whole club down. However, throughout this process, in what Beck (2012) 
has coined as ‘Merkiavellism’, Germany has increased its negotiating power by doing 
nothing but staying put. Throughout the period 2010-2012 the more Merkel took a passive 
role when it came to meet the demands for more German action to save the euro, the more 
she gained political leverage against the leaders of the peripheral countries and France. This 
newly acquired power has been recognised throughout the EU, including the UK, and 
beyond. Political leaders in the US, China and Russia know that if they need to call one 
number in Europe it is that of Angela Merkel.  
History shows that once power is obtained it is not easy to relinquish. Precisely this is what 
might happen right now to policymakers in Berlin. Certain branches of the German political 
elite have realised that they can act as the British and the French.6 They know that if Europe 
wants to have a voice in an increasingly multipolar world it needs to unite, but for the 
moment Germany has enough weight to postpone this process. Germany has veto power on 
any decision that is taken in the Euro Area and this might not be the case in a 
parliamentarised political union with a European executive and a European legislative. This 
could explain why in principle Germany finds itself comfortable with the intergovernmental 
‘union method’ adopted for both the ESM and the banking union. In both instances the 
ultimate decisions will be taken in the Council, where Berlin has overwhelming power.  
Besides, for the German political elite and for the German public at large, the performance of 
the European Commission throughout the crisis has been considered to be deficient due to its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Interview with senior German official, London, 7 November 2013.	  
weak enforcement capacity.7 There is a sense that the Commission has been soft with the 
peripheral countries in imposing discipline and forcing them to undertake structural reforms. 
The example of Greece – and the lack of far-reaching structural reforms there – is presented 
as evidence that the supranational authorities might not be able to perform their duties 
efficiently, which means that the idea of a political union loses appeal both for the elites and 
the general public, which ultimately would have to vote in favour of such a project through a 
referendum, which would be the first in the Federal Republic.  
4.2 Public Opinion Backlash  
Focusing on Germany’s public opinion leads to the second explanation on why the German 
government has dropped the goal of pursuing political union from its agenda. Although the 
German public has become more critical with European integration since the creation of the 
euro (Bulmer & Paterson 2010), another important tipping point in this structural trend seems 
to have been the crucial European Council meeting in late June 2012, which agreed to 
establish the banking union. The outcome of that Council meeting was generally interpreted 
in the European press as a clear victory of the indebted South and the first serious defeat for 
Merkel since the beginning of the crisis. In Germany the ganging-up tactics of the Club Med 
countries were met with fierce criticism. The leaders of Italy and Spain were accused of 
blackmailing Merkel and there was widespread anger about giving away the ‘carrot’ of 
banking union without disciplining once and for all the countries from the periphery (Rahman 
2012).  
Deep-rooted stereotypes were reactivated during this period. The sense among the German 
public was that, as always – and despite the signing of the Fiscal Compact which should 
enshrine the culture of fiscal discipline in all member states – the southern countries were 
after the German wallet without accepting that short-term financial support will not solve 
their longstanding structural problems. Furthermore, there was a sense that a real banking 
union was a fiscal union by the backdoor, and this would mean that the south had achieved 
what the German public has always feared, namely the creation of a transfer union without 
centralised control of tax revenues in the corrupt countries of the periphery. Jens Weidmann 
summarised these feelings by recognising that, as it had been a mistake to create a monetary 
union without political union in Maastricht, it might be a mistake to establish a banking union 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The Eurobarometer shows that from 2007 (EB67) until 2013 (EB80) trust in the European Commission 
plummeted among German public opinion from 49% to 34%.	  	  
without a “comprehensive reform of the supervisory regulatory framework and of the 
respective national scope for economic and fiscal policy” (cited in BUBA 2012).  
The feeling of being again cornered by the Club Med countries was strengthened when 
Draghi (2012) delivered his much quoted speech in London where he stated that the ECB was 
ready to do “whatever it takes” to save the euro. The sentiment of betrayal was further 
reinforced when the ECB announced its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme 
– which is fiercely opposed by the Bundesbank on the grounds that it signifies a breach of the 
“no bail-out clause” enshrined in the Maastricht treaty. By then the president of the 
Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann, a much respected figure by the German public, was seen as 
losing his power of influencing decisions at the ECB’s governing council. The ECB was 
portrayed in the German press as the new Banca d’Italia led by Draghi who was ready to use 
the old trick of state financing in order to inflate away the debt of the peripheral countries. 
This triggered thousands of lawsuits at the German Federal Court of Justice against the OMT. 
All this had major implications in the psyche of many Germans. Weidmann’s isolation made 
them realise that by establishing one day a political union, Germany might not be able to win 
the necessary majorities to enforce what they see as their rightful and successful ordoliberal 
model. In this sense, the idea of political union might be less appealing from a German point 
of view. It is no coincidence therefore that in the run-up to the Federal elections held in 
September 2013 emerges the new anti-euro party Alternative für Deutschland. The arrival of 
this formation in the political arena has both surfed on a changing public discourse around 
European integration and contributed to change it further towards increasing Euroscepticism. 
Before, questioning European integration was politically incorrect in Germany, now it is 
acceptable, and a party with an open anti-euro discourse has almost achieved the 5% 
threshold of votes that are required to enter the German Bundestag. Significantly, AfD 
obtained 7% of the German votes in the European elections. Hence, calling for political union 
in the EU is less popular than it was, and this might be the reason why the German political 
establishment has decided to drop the concept from its political programme. 
4.3 Nothing goes without France 
The two explanations put forward above have a lot of truth in them, but they are not entirely 
convincing. Despite the new German political establishment being more at ease in fighting 
for their national interests and the German public being less constraint in criticising the EU, 
two recent episodes demonstrate that Germany remains committed to the idea of creating a 
political union to sustain EMU, under the Chartalist logic of money explained above. The 
first relates to the way key German politicians such as Martin Schulz (president of the 
European Parliament and lead candidate for the European socialists) and Klaus Welle 
(secretary general of the European Parliament and senior politician of the CDU) have driven 
the Spitzenkandidaten campaign in the run up to the European elections. The second has to do 
with the pressure that the German public has applied upon Merkel to resist the blackmailing 
tactics of the British Prime Minister David Cameron and accept Jean-Claude Juncker as the 
new President of the Commission following precisely the Spitzenkandidaten logic. Both these 
actions have shown again that both the German political establishment and public opinion at 
large remain the most fervent believers in the idea of a more democratic and federal Europe.8  
This general sentiment was again articulated by Wolfgang Schäuble – exactly 20 years after 
his paper with Lamers – in a landmark speech delivered two days after the European 
elections. In it Schäuble (2014) recognises that the intergovernmental arrangements adopted 
throughout the crisis are only “second best solutions” and therefore that it is necessary to go 
back to the community method through treaty changes. He endorses the Spitzenkandidaten 
process and goes even further advocating the direct election of the European Commission 
president by the citizens of the EU. Furthermore, he emphasises the necessity of reform 
following the principal of subsidiarity not only in one direction, as is commonly understood 
in Britain, but both ways. A wide range of issues should be decided at the local, regional and 
national level, but when it comes to cross-border phenomena such as “trade, financial 
markets, currency issues, climate, environment and energy, as well as foreign policy and 
security policy […] only the European level can successfully take long-term action”. Aware 
of the new political landscape critical with the EU, Schäuble goes even beyond the concepts 
of ‘political union’ and the ‘United States of Europe’ often used by euro-federalists (and 
fiercely opposed by eurosceptics) and argues that the EU should rather be a “multilevel 
democracy”. “Not a federal state whose centre of gravity would lie in the middle of a political 
structure that is almost like a nation state. But at the same time it should be much more than a 
confederation of states, whose connections remain weak and lacking legitimacy”. The last 
point is important, because from a Chartalist perspective it is the legitimacy of the political 
authority that makes a monetary system sustainable.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	   The 2013 Fall Eurobarometer (No.80) survey shows that 69% of Germans were in favour of the 
Spitzenkandidaten process. The latest Eurobarometer (Spring 2014, No.81) also shows that 75% of the German 
public is in favour of EMU.	  	  
Here we see how Germany is still committed to further integration. Eurosceptics might say 
that Schäuble’s views have become a minority in Germany, but as mentioned above the 
success of the Spitzenkandidaten campaign – which was driven mostly by German politicians 
and the German public– does not support this thesis. Generally the political establishment in 
Germany remains favourable to more integration but they do not want to impose it against the 
will of their partners, especially without counting with France, which right now is mired in 
euroscepticism, as the European elections have shown. As explained above, Germany 
remains a reluctant hegemon. Although this was not apparent at the beginning of the crisis, 
(Bulmer & Paterson 2010), many of its elites are extremely worried about Germany 
becoming a ‘normal power’ and the anti-German backlash that this may trigger across the 
Continent (Giddens 2014).9 Thus, Germany’s cautiousness in relation to pushing for treaty 
change and political union is explained by the fact that it feels that yet again the time is not 
ripe for France to enter the game. And without the participation of France, any attempt to 
deepen political integration will not be successful. 
While the discussion around the necessity of political union to save the euro is part of the 
German public debate, this is not the case in France. There the sense is that the Euro Area 
should rather work on the establishment of a gouvernement économique which should 
harmonize labour markets and the social welfare and taxing systems. Despite recent 
weaknesses due to declining competitiveness and increased public debt, the French political 
establishment is still convinced that the French social-economic model is the way to go for 
the rest of Europe. They perceive it as the only model that limits excessive inequality and 
therefore preserves social cohesion and decent living and working standards for all. This 
franco-français attitude creates a lot of frustration in Berlin (Schild 2013b). There is a sense 
that economic cultures have converged over the past 20 years (the French socialists signing 
the Fiscal Compact is a case in point), but generally speaking there are still many differences 
in approach. Germany remains convinced that price stability and fiscal restrain is the way to 
go, while officials in Bercy still worry about unemployment and growth and how they can 
stimulate domestic demand with public spending. Right now, in the midst of the crisis, the 
expenditure of the French state is 56% of GDP. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  This was recognised by a senior German official under the Chatham House rule, Madrid, 21 July 2014. He also 
acknowledged that smaller partner states such as Austria, Finland and The Netherlands have voiced their 
concerns about the intergovernmental solutions adopted during the crisis. They supported them as crisis 
management solutions but they cannot become the new modus operandi of the Union. 	  
Therefore it can be argued that the old tensions in economic and monetary culture between 
France and Germany have not disappeared. Paris still demands from Germany to use its 
economic power to support the solidarity principles of the Union, while Berlin urges France 
to commit to structural reforms to be fitter for an increasingly globalised world and to cede 
control of national budgets to the centre so that the culture of fiscal discipline can be 
consolidated (Schild 2013a). The best example of this tension is the debate around 
Eurobonds. Both Sarkozy and Hollande have openly stated that it would be a good solution to 
solve the euro crisis because it would mean the mutualisation of the liabilities of the Union 
and it would provide international investors with a risk-free financial instrument that could be 
an alternative to US treasury securities. International demand for these assets would in turn 
reduce the financing costs of the Eurozone as a whole. The response from Merkel (with the 
implicit backing of the Bundesbank and Federal Court of Justice) has been that there would 
not be any Eurobonds as long as she lives, unless, of course, political union is achieved. In 
other words, the German answer to French demands is thus: there cannot be any 
mutualisation of liabilities, if there is no mutualisation of revenues. To this, however, the 
response from Paris is: “No, thanks”.10  
Overall then France and Germany are in a gridlock. Neither wants to concede, and they 
appear to use vague, general concepts to put their counterpart into the defensive.11 When 
Paris asks for Eurobonds, Berlin says this can only be done after Politische Union. In turn, 
when Berlin makes the case for political union, Paris replies that the first step towards 
political union should be a French inspired gouvernment économique aimed at harmonising 
economic and social policies, which is something that puts Berlin off. Hence, by observing 
French elusiveness, the feeling among the German political elite is that there is no appetite in 
the other member states to pursue political union. And since Germany does not believe that it 
is wise to take the leadership without Paris, efforts to build a political union have been scaled 
back – for now. Again this sentiment was articulated best by Weidmann by saying: “seeing 
how reluctant some countries are to relinquish their fiscal policy autonomy – even in return 
for financial assistance – it is hard to imagine political union being achieved in the 
foreseeable future” (cited in BUBA 2012). This is the reason why Germany has back-rowed 
on the creation of the banking union. It is fully aware that a real banking union necessitates a 
fiscal union, but it is convinced that a fiscal union requires a legitimate political union first.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  This was acknowledged by a senior German official under the Chatham House rule, Madrid, 21 July 2014.	  
11	  I thank Nicolas Jabko for illustrating me this point. 	  
 5. Conclusion 
 
Accepting the Chartalist understanding of money which says that any monetary space needs a 
political authority to stabilise it, and convinced that legitimate sovereignty at the European 
level can only be achieved through a non-hegemonic process, German political leaders (be it 
in government or at the Bundesbank) have in numerous occasions over the past quarter of 
century forcefully argued in favour of establishing a political union to underpin the euro. The 
last time this was done by the German Chancellor was at the peak of the eurozone debt crisis 
when Merkel said in German national television that EMU needs a fiscal union, and before 
that a political union. However, after the crucial European Council meeting of June 2012 – 
when the leaders of France, Italy and Spain convinced Merkel to establish a banking union –
the German political establishment eliminated the concept of political union from the German 
public debate both during the German elections in 2013 and the European elections in 2014. 
This paper has tried to find explanations to this apparent u-turn.  
The first possible explanation is that Germany is starting to behave as a normal power like 
France and the UK. The new generations of political leaders in Germany do not feel 
constraint by the burden of history and are more inclined to fight more forcefully for their 
own national interests. Under this logic, Germany is unwilling to enter into a political union, 
because an intergovernmental configuration offers it veto power. The second explanation is 
intertwined with the first by pointing to the fact that the German public has always resisted 
the idea of being locked into a transfer union with the Southern members of the EU. This 
sentiment was reinforced once it was reported that the leaders of the Clud Med countries had 
used blackmailing tactics against the German Chancellor to make her sign the banking union, 
which, if properly conceived, implies the creation of a fiscal union by the backdoor. The rise 
of this increased euroscepticism in Germany is epitomised by the emergence of the anti-euro 
party Alternative für Deutschland, which has shocked the political establishment in Germany 
and changed the political discourse in the country. It is now politically acceptable to criticise 
the EU and demand a stop to further integration. This can certainly explain why the 
Chancellor has refrained from calling for political union in Europe. 
These two explanations point to two undeniable trends in German politics, however they are 
not totally convincing. The last European elections have shown that Germany remains 
committed to a more federalised Europe. The way the political establishment and the general 
public have embraced the Spitzenkandidaten campaign and how they have forced Merkel to 
accept Jean-Claude Juncker as the new Commission President – despite fierce opposition 
from London against a federalist candidate – provide support to this thesis. Hence, German 
reluctance to push for political union is better explained by a third factor based on the notion 
that Germany remains a reluctant hegemon that will not impose its will against the desires of 
the other member states of EMU, especially France. For 50 years European integration has 
been driven by the Franco-German marriage and this is likely to continue. For this to happen, 
however, France needs to overcome its lethargy. It needs to regain its economic strength and 
play a more active role in the construction of the future of Europe. Hollande (2013) has 
recently recognised this and declared that Paris is ready to enter into a conversation with 
Berlin regarding the establishment of a political union in Europe. So far these have been mere 
words without much action. 
Following the Chartalist logic of money, EMU needs a legitimised political authority to be 
sustainable in the long run. Germany could be the benevolent hegemon that could perform 
this task, but given the past history it is very difficult to see this happening. Germany does 
not want to lead and the rest of Europe is uncomfortable with a German Europe. The 
aftermath of the Eurozone crisis has given Germany already too much power and the German 
elites are starting to be aware of this. They know that German power is more accepted when 
it is embedded within deeper European integration structures. Schäuble is well aware of this 
and his 2014 speech in favour of treaty change and further integration is another clear 
message to Paris, and beyond, that Germany is serious about continuing with the Monnet 
method. Thus, those that criticise Berlin to do too little to make EMU more sustainable 
should better aim their criticism towards Paris. Ultimately, as Javier Solana (2014) has 
argued, “France should not be afraid of exchanging some of its sovereignty for political union 
in Europe”, not least because in a globalised world it is only through a more united and 
stronger Europe that France will be able to uphold its cherished social model and values.  
It is likely that French long term strategists are aware of this. They seem to be waiting for 
France to regain its strength. Many in Paris believe that the demographic trends favour them. 
It is assumed that by mid century France will have the same population than Germany12, so 
from their point of view it is smarter to delay negotiations leading to political union to a time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The French National Institute of Demographic Studies estimates that this will happen in 2055. See Pison 
(2012). 
when Germany is less powerful vis-à-vis France. The big question, however, is whether the 
orphan euro will still be around by then.  
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